Beyond The Refromation
Leokadiya Drobizheva, the leader of that project, concluded similarly that in the republics of the Russian Federation `the elite and significant circles of the titular ethnoses still live on the wave of the explosion of national self-awareness, striving to exploit what they achieved in the 1990-93 process of sovereignisation’.35 Relevant to our topic, ethnic Russians in the republics examined in the project showed significantly lower ethnic awareness than representatives of the titular populations. In Tatarstan, 27.2% of ethnic Russians confirmed that ‘I never forget that I am Russian’; Russians in Tuva scored 37% and in Sakha 21.5%. The titular populations scored considerably higher: in Tatarstan 50.5%, in Tuva 71.5% and in Sakha 54.5%. Russians also proved to be, in Drobizheva’s words, `less ethno-accentuated’ when relating to the proposition: `It is necessary to feel part of a national group’. In Tatarstan, 39.9% of Russians agreed on this (titular population 57.1%), in Tuva 46.4% (79.9%) and in Sakha 37.4% (73.9%).36 Despite increased domination of the titular population in the leadership of the republics, ethnic Russians to a significant extent support economic independence (samostoyatel’nost’) of the republics.37
Polls conducted in 1998 confirm the impression of strong regional identities also among Russians in the republics. When the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) asked respondents across Russia (not defined by nationality) what they considered themselves more-citizens of Russia or inhabitants of their oblast’ or republic-29% chose the first option, while 35% chose the latter; 22% said `both equally’, and 9% ‘neither’.38 One might add that a total of 65% of respondents in another FOM poll agreed that `ethnic Russians [russkie] should govern Russia, then everything will be fine’. Twenty-nine per cent disagreed with this proposition. Support was greatest among the parts of the electorate typically associated with communist and nationalist parties and leaders; those least adapted to the new realities, critical of the current authorities, with least education, lowest income, and those older than 50 years of age.39
Countering claims that ethnic awareness remains high in the republics, Emil Pain, an acknowledged scholar and Russian presidential adviser on nationalities issues, concluded that the national movements in all of Russia’s republics had come to play a lesser role over the last couple of years. The statements by the leaders of national movements on the question of the fifth point in the passport were, he said, `comparatively limp and, most importantly, attracted little public attention’.40
In any case, it can be safely assumed that public opinion on these matters is being constantly shaped in the political processes taking place at a national and a republican level. The character and intensity of national identity can be seriously influenced by elites, cultural or political. Time and again in the FSU, we have seen politicians aim to compensate for poor achievements in other fields by outbidding others in the field of nationality. The history of the former communist countries over the past decade provides a lot of success stories to inspire such attempts by frustrated elites.
Playing the national card
The risks involved in playing a `titular population national card’ in the case of Russia’s ethnically defined subjects, however, become evident when we consider the demographic composition of these subjects. In nine of the 21 republics, more than half of the population is in fact ethnic Russian. For instance, Russians made up 79% in Khakassia, 58% in Komi and 70% in Buryatiya. In these, titular nationalism has not played a great role in post-Soviet Russia. Even in several of the republics with nationalistic elites, Russians are the largest single group; in Bashkortostan they make up 39%, whereas the Bashkirs make up a mere 22%. In Tatarstan the Tatars numbered 49%, but even here the Russians made up as much as 43%.41
Whereas the large number of ethnic Russians in these republics may be a result of demographic changes over the past few decades, and these changes to some extent may have been instigated by the Soviet authorities as part of national rather than, for instance, economic policy reasons, the Russians living in these republics cannot reasonably be denied citizens’ rights on the basis of their ethnicity. This argument, of course, would be valid even if the Russians should be only a small minority, but strikes even harder when the somewhat privileged nationality is a minority.
In a society where certain privileges are already being allocated to individuals on the basis of their ethnicity, it is only a small step from arguing not only against privileges for a minority group but in favour of primacy of one’s own, larger, group. Even a thinker as sophisticated as Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has used the demographic argument against today’s ethnically defined republics: these, he argues, represent `anti-democracy’: `Yes, the nation should control, administratively control, only the territory where it makes up a clear majority, and better, a qualified majority’.42 The Nobel laureate did not on this occasion comment on just how deprived of rights those should be who did not belong to the `qualified majority’ nationality.
Essentially, we are again confronting the proposition advanced by Lenin, that the nationalisms of `oppressed peoples’ are somehow more likable than those of the ‘oppressors’. In reality, allocating political rights according to ethnicity only repeats an illiberal practice on a smaller scale.
Considerations in the centre
The reactions in Moscow to the new passport serve to highlight the wide ideological differences among mainstream Russian political actors. Whereas we have seen that the voices that have been heard from the republics have been favouring the continued use of the fifth point, this institution has both friends and enemies among Moscow’s (mostly ethnic Russian) political life. Here, the debate over the new passport has brought about the most peculiar alliances, and the most opportunistic lines of reasoning.
Liberal co-existence; illiberal assimilation
As far as categorical support of the abolition of the fifth point is concerned, we find this in three of the parties represented in the State Duma: Grigorii Yavlinsky’s Yabloko, then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia (NDR), and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). These parties each have their distinct reasons to support the regime on this issue.
Chernomyrdin’s party is a highly heterogeneous and ideologically fluid entity. NDR has-at least before Chernomyrdin was dismissed in March 1998-been characterised by its unconditional support of the regime’s policies. That being so, the party’s position on most questions, and its justification of the position, can be expected to coincide with that of the regime. Yabloko is the most ideologically coherent party of the three. Yavlinsky, while having a clear populist touch, has time and again defended liberal causes at a cost. He can be safely trusted when he states that a man’s nationality should be his own business only, and that this position springs from a genuinely liberal perspective.
That is clearly not the case with the ultra-populist-nationalist Zhirinovsky and his one-man party. In late October Zhirinovsky and leading Yabloko politician Vladimir Lukin, in an unlikely joint appearance, described the nationality line as ‘barbarism’. `No civilised country has such a thing. It is a violation of all international norms’, they said.43 Zhirinovsky, however, assumed the liberal position from a completely different point of view than the Yabloko leaders. From his erratic rantings over the last seven years or so, one of the points that have remained on Zhirinovsky’s political programme has been the abolition of the current Russian federal system and re-establishment of the tsarist system of gubernii-governorships. With Zhirinovsky’s countless imperialist, racist and Russian supremacist remarks in mind, we can safely conclude that the LDPR leader is once again trying to appeal to the guts of the ethnic Russian lumpen.
Another Russian nationalist who earlier has made a point of eliminating the fifth point, is former vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi. When Rutskoi re-launched himself as a politician in 1994-95, he explicitly spoke in favour of abolishing the fifth point. Before Soviet rule in Russia, there was no `national question’, he claimed. Such a question could not arise, because there was no fifth point. `Do you ask your friend, for instance, what nationality he is? If you are a decent man, you do not give a damn what colour his hair is, the slant of his eyes, and so on-right?’44 Again, however, there is good reason to see this statement in the light of other aspects of Rutskoi’s political platform: basically, Rutskoi (who is presently the governor of Kursk) is a hard-line nationalist. He may not be a Russian supremacist like Zhirinovsky, but he does tend to equate russkii with rossiiskii and even ‘Soviet’; and he insists that `the geopolitical expanse on which we live is Russian [russkii] land’.45
In other words, the forces in the centre favouring abolition of the fifth point are doing this from very different perspectives. At one end of the spectrum are the liberal democrats (not those of Zhirinovsky’s misnamed party), who are significantly inspired by Western practices. At the other end are majority group nationalists who wish to see ethnic differences (at least politically) neutralised.
Notably, furthermore, the wish to see ethnic differences politically neutralised may be prompted by two quite different motivations. On the one hand, given that such a process would obviously strengthen the position of the majority group, one motivation might be an ultimately supremacist wish for domination (given that this supremacism is culturally and not somehow genetically founded). On the other hand, given that neutralisation of ethnic differences would eliminate one source of political unrest and a potent fulcrum for political organisation, it would also serve the cause of the gosudarstvenniki and derzhavniki. To these, the cohesion and power of the state is the main concern. In real life, one and the same Russian nationalist will tend to carry both these motivations. The relationships between the two will vary and-since `patriotism’ is such a valued sentiment in Russia and nationalism is spoken of as such a vice-the former motivation may be denied.46
Just as different actors have spoken in favour of the abolition of the fifth point for very different reasons, opponents of its abolition have also clearly diverged in motives. Duma speaker Gennadii Seleznev, representing the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov, justified keeping the fifth point by referring to the constitutional establishment of `each citizen’s right’ to state his nationality, and played down the corresponding right not to do so. Thus, Seleznev proposed that passport-holders should have the freedom to decide whether they should fill in the space for nationality or not. `Who does not want this to be mentioned? Who is afraid of his nationality?’ Seleznev asked rhetorically.47
This last comment in Russia has a rather ominous ring to it. Duma deputy Anatol Greshnevikov, representing Popular Rule, a nationalist faction close to Zyuganov, made it explicit: `Russians do not have to be ashamed of their nationality while it is quite understandable that sons of lawyers are against such a clause’.48 Zhirinovsky, who many times has made anti-Semitic remarks, has in fact been proved to have a Jewish father himself. His one-time comment `my mother was Russian, my father was a lawyer’ has become a standard phrase to hint that people are clumsily concealing their true origins.
As far as the communists’ support for upholding the fifth point is concerned, this should not come as any surprise. Above all, the fifth point is a heritage from the `golden years’ of the USSR, and the KPRF is a party characterised by a strong nostalgia. In its 1997 programme the party describes itself as the party of `patriotism, internationalism and friendship of the peoples’. Echoing Soviet proclamations, it promises to bring about a national policy `based on the acknowledgment of the equal rights of nations, the historical responsibility of each people [narod] for the state entity of Russia, eradication of inter-ethnic [mezhnatsional’nykh] conflicts, all forms of nationalism and separatism’.49 When Zyuganov’s party is in favour of maintaining the fifth point, one explanation is that this is an instinctive reaction to a challenge against the Soviet heritage.
Moreover, the KPRF under Zyuganov’s leadership has in reality represented a confused mixture of Soviet internationalism, Russian nationalism and pre-Soviet Russian imperialism. Before the 1995 Duma elections Zyuganov made sure to address the ethnic Russians specifically: `The russkii people was the gathering people, the great power people, around which the Slav core formed our powerful and unitary state’. The fate of the 25 million ethnic Russians left outside Russia’s borders after 1991 he described as `my own, personal drama’.50 In the light of this-although one may sincerely feel that the constitutionally defined right to state one’s nationality is as justified as the right not to do so-there may be some reason not to accept the Communist Party’s arguments in the passport case at face value.
While Zyuganov balances his russkii-centred statements with statements about the brotherhood of peoples in a way that keeps analysts in the fog, others try to do the same but fail more obviously to convince. One example is Sergei Baburin, a prominent, radical Russian nationalist and deputy speaker of the Duma. Despite his very clear ethnic Russians-first attitudes, Baburin has put a double modifier in the name of the organisation he is heading: in Russian, it reads Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soyuz-`the All-Russian All-Peoples’ Union’. Baburin himself has said that in ratifying the name, the ROS leadership emphasised the word `all-peoples’, explaining that `we are for the Russian [russkii] idea, but as a unifying, not as an ethnic idea’.51
Russian `apartheid ‘
While minority group nationalists may advocate the maintenance of the fifth point because of fear of being assimilated into a larger group, majority group nationalists may end up with the same position, from the opposite point of departure: they do not want the blood of their presumably ‘pure’ people to be polluted.
Normally, only very radical majority group nationalists will express such a position publicly. The strongest of these groups in Russia today is Aleksandr Barkashov’s militant neo-Nazi Russian National Unity (RNE). This group claims that the Soviet regime pursued a `racial programme … so that the Russians would to the largest possible extent lose their national appearance and traits of their national-racial Indo-European-Aryan-genotype’.53 Among the policies craved by the RNE is a prohibition of any encouragement of mixed marriages.53
Another exponent of a similar position is former KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov, who was quite a prominent actor in the radical nationalist opposition in the early 1990s. `We need a purely Russian [russkoe] solution’, he concluded, referring to evils ranging from the 1917 revolution to El’tsin’s regime.54 Notably, the Russians-first position of both Barkashov and Sterligov is fed above all by a ferocious antiSemitism.
The regime: in need of a cause
In many comments on the new passport the point of departure has been the statements in the December 1993 Constitution, a document hurriedly written by people close to El’tsin after the October showdown between president and parliament. In fact, the declarations here do not take us very far in terms of clarification. Indeed, it is tempting to see the relevant article, Article 26, as itself an expression of the Janus face of the fifth point. Seemingly accepting nationality as being potentially both an asset and a liability, Article 26 reads as follows:
Everyone shall have the right to determine and state (opredelyat’i ukazat’) his national affiliation (prinadlezhnost’). No one can be forced to determine and state his national identity. Everyone shall have the right to use his native language, freely choose the language of communication, education, training and creative work (emphases added).55
Judging by the press reports, the bureaucrats in the presidential administration and the Interior Ministry who prepared the new passport were caught by surprise by the scope and intensity of the reactions to the elimination of the fifth point. The reports indicate that those responsible concluded without much ado that Article 26 left them no other option than to leave out ‘nationality’.56 This decision, furthermore, was not subject to much attention in the early reports on the new passport; these rather focused on the new colour, state symbol, and technicalities regarding distribution. Of course, one could speculate that the regime manipulated the coverage to minimise attention to this change. That would not, however, explain the silence from the numerous publications that do not feel obliged to serve the regime.
Probably the main conclusion that can be drawn with regard to the El’tsin regime’s position on nationality issues is that it would rather keep away from them altogether. While El’tsin during his presidency has repeatedly shifted his position to match what seemed to be the public mood, he has not done so in any major way with regard to nationality matters in his own country. In relation to other FSU states, he has spoken for the rights of ethnic Russians (using a series of confusing terms). But in the case of the Chechen war, he never made ethnicity a point; here, statehood was always the focus. As George Breslauer and Catherine Dale have summarised, El’tsin `did indeed raise the rhetorical stakes when challenged, but within broad parameters that were generally consistent with the thrust of his earlier rhetoric of state-and nation-building,.57
The President himself dealt briefly with the passport issue in late November 1997 in a meeting with his prime minister and the speakers of the two Federal Assembly chambers-the `Big Four’ forum. Faced with the opposition from both speakers– Seleznev and the Federation Council speaker, Igor Stroev-El’tsin easily opted for a slight revision of the passport design. After that meeting, Seleznev reported that the disputes might be settled with special supplementary sheets, where ethnically defined federal subjects could include the nationality line Ss As a matter of fact, such inserts could probably be added without much formal difficulty since the statute on the passport allows for `inserted elements’ for certain purposes.59 In that sense, the storm over the new passport may be calmed to the satisfaction of the ethnic republics without the need to alter the original design.
If inserts including `point five’ are introduced, this will satisfy the republican nationalist forces. On the other hand, all problematic aspects of having to list one’s nationality are maintained. It is very likely that once a citizen of, for example, Tatarstan has had an insert added to his passport, he will feel a pressure towards stating his nationality there. When belonging to a titular population in itself qualifies one for specific privileges, the freedom of choice guaranteed by the constitution is no longer complete. The local elite will decide on the standard for their republic, and the Soviet system, with all its implications, will be maintained mostly unchanged.
The various consequences with regard to minority (or even majority) rights are thereby also maintained. New examples are added to the long list of cases where claims to self-determination do not definitely solve the problems of national matreshka states. Furthermore, the opponents of the new passport may not be content even if inserts are employed: the question of the passport cover has not been resolved. It should be pointed out that the two-headed eagle is not only the state symbol of imperial Russia; it has long since been used as the state symbol of post-Soviet Russia, although it has not been finally approved as such by the Duma.60 Should the pressure on the regime to change this build up further, one could envisage a bewildered process of public soul-searching on behalf of the new Russian statehood.
As a matter of fact, this process has already begun. In August 1996 El’tsin initiated a project which was to formulate a new `national ideology’ to unite all citizens of Russia: `In Russian history of the twentieth century, there were various periods: monarchism, totalitarianism, perestroika, and finally a democratic path of development. Each stage had its ideology. We have none’, he stated.61 It is very tempting to see this initiative as one aimed at trying to use ideational means to prop up an unpopular regime. As for the specific statement, it is suggestive of El’tsin’s confusion that he not only equates regime type with ‘ideology’ but also in effect refers to `democratic path of development’ as a thing of the past. Which makes one wonder: where is Russia positioned today? And: is it in need of a path of development different from the democratic one?
The way things turned out, the commission established by El’tsin to deal with the issue quickly ran into the problem of how to spot a Russian idea. When this commission, headed by presidential adviser Georg Satarov, presented its report after one year’s work, it had in effect given up: The report bore the title `Russia in search of ideas. An analysis of the press’.62 Not only had ‘idea’ become ‘ideas’; the report itself amounted basically to a digest of reports from liberal newspapers, and content analysis of these. In a sense, Satarov was right in his conclusion that perhaps the very search for a national idea is a key Russian national trait. However, this does not go very far in terms of binding the peoples of Russia together.
There is hardly any material available today enabling us to reach an ironclad conclusion on what consequences the introduction of the fifth point and the internal passport have had in the USSR and its successor states. This article has been an attempt to bring the discussion a few steps further, by taking into account the status of these institutions in the current Russian political realm. The new information that I have introduced can do no more than indicate positions, and even then only elite positions. A great number of possible mechanisms may be identified, shaping the proclaimed attitudes of elites in the provinces and in the centre. A simple but important question such as `are the elites in the republics expressing nationalist views attempting to reflect a public mood, or are they doing so trying to shape that mood’, probably can not be answered decisively.
Bearing these limitations in mind, we may summarise the above discussions briefly to indicate the direction of a conclusion. While the depth and breadth in the reactions to the abolition of the fifth point in the republics is still a matter of dispute, the voices that have reached the centre-representing the political leaderships of a long list of republics-have been in unison in condemning the abolition. According to Zaslavsky’s interpretation, this would not by itself serve as any indication of the preferences of the public in the republics. According to Brubaker’s interpretation, however, this seems to be a clear indication that there is a widespread feeling in the republics that the fifth point is benefiting the titular peoples.63 This point is made given that we do not know the details of how, in these specific instances, what shapes what-elite attitudes or (perceived) public attitudes. Circumstantial evidence supports this latter position.
With regard to the federal centre, the positions of major political actors seem to make sense only in the context of Brubaker’s interpretation. A politician like Yavlinsky would contradict everything he stands for if he viewed the effects of the fifth point as Zaslavsky does and still supported its abolition. Similarly, Zhirinovsky would hardly be in favour of the abolition if he thought that would slow down a process of Russification.
Of course, one might argue that some politicians in fact consider that the point has been reached where a swift homogenisation of the population would take place once all ethnic sluices were opened. However, this seems rather far-fetched, given the ethnic revivals that have taken place across Russia over the past 10 years or so. It may also be added that Karklins addressed this specific issue in her 1986 book mentioned earlier. Even then, at the end of the tunnel of Brezhnevism, she pointed out-admittedly on the basis of very thin material-that at least some of the non-Russians seemed to have been upset over suggestions that the fifth point be abolished, when the internal passport was re-designed in 1974.64
In sum, this analysis suggests that one consequence of the continued existence of the fifth point is that politicians, intelligentsia and others today have an easier task than they otherwise would, if they for nationalistic purposes should wish to give new, politically relevant, contents to ‘hibernating’ identities.
This is obviously a process taking place in many instances today not only within the Russian Federation, but also in the rest of the former Soviet Union.
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
1 The author would like to thank Tor Bukkvoll, Pal Kolsto, Anatol Yamskov and the anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier versions of this article.
2 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 23.
Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society (M. E. Sharpe, 1982), p. 100.
4 In the Soviet Union, 14 of the 15 union republics were ethnically defined-as the homelands of Ukrainians, Latvians, Kazakhs etc. Only the largest one was not: the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Here the word used for ‘Russian’ was rossiiskii (`all-Russian’), as opposed to russkii (Russian in an ethnic sense). At the same time, however, this union republic was itself made up of a large number of smaller entities, of which many were ethnically defined. Only the ethnic Russians, who in 1989 made up 81.5% of the RSFSR population and 50.8% of the USSR population, did not have an entity allocated for them specifically.
5 Francine Hirsch, `The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses’, Slavic Review, 56, 2, 1997, p. 255. 6 Incidentally, one Jewish activist who in late 1997 spoke in favour of maintaining the fifth point argued that while the fifth point undeniably created conditions for ethnic discrimination, it also served as a deterrent to discrimination in that it forced the totalitarian system to adhere to certain `percentage quotas’ in e.g. employment and education. `The absence of the “nationality” parameter would have allowed the system to reduce those quotas to zero’, he argued. See Aleksandr Frenkel, vice chairman of the Jewish Association of St Petersburg, `In defense of “line five”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 November 1997, quoted in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIX, 45, 1997, p. 14. Another aspect of the fifth point, which by itself benefited the Jews, and also Germans, Greeks and Armenians, in the last decades of the Soviet Union, was that it in effect served as a criterion to decide who might have an opportunity to emigrate. This particular aspect, however, falls outside the present discussion. 7 Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 191. 8 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 32. 9 Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State, p. 103. mo Ibid.
11 Pavel Baev & Pal Kolsto, `Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Union’, in Sven Gunnar Simonsen (ed.), Conflicts in the OSCE Area (PRIO, 1997), p. 107. For an in-depth analysis of demographic developments in the Russian Empire and the USSR, see Pal Kolsto, Russians in the former Soviet republics (London, Hurst, 1995).
12 Veljko Vujacic & Victor Zaslavsky, `The Causes of Disintegration in the USSR and Yugoslavia’, Telos, No. 88, Summer 1991, p. 123.
13 Barbara A. Anderson & Brian D. Silver, `Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-Russians in the USSR’, Demography, 20, 4, November 1983, pp. 461489.
14 Figures reprinted in Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR. The Perspective From Below (Allen & Unwin, 1986) p. 38. It could be speculated that the outcome of these choices might have been different in rural areas. Ethnic Russians were particularly numerous in the cities in both the RSFSR and in the other union republics, and Russian nationality may therefore have been considered as a relatively greater asset there.
15 Stated by Mikhail Kulichenko, 1972. Quoted in Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State, p. 96. 16 The term encompassed both nats (nations) and (some but not all) narody (peoples). The distinction between these two was one of assumed development. ” Hirsch, `The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress’, pp. 251-278. Is Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, p. 15.
‘9 Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR (Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 3.
20 Yuri Slezkine, `The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism’, Slavic Review, 53. 2, 1994, p. 415. 2 Ibid., p. 414.
22 1 am indebted to Anatol Yamskov for this point.
23 For an analysis of Tishkov’s programme as a minister, see Victor A. Kremenyuk, Conflicts in and Around Russia. Nation-Building in Difficult Times (Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 55-66. See also Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame (PRIO/Sage, 1997).
24 I am grateful to Anatol Yamskov for making this point to me. 25 `Tataria Rejects Russian Passports-Because They Don’t Have a Line for “Nationality”‘, Kommersant-Daily, 18 October 1997, quoted in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIX, 42, 1997, p. 7.
26 A bill on Tatarstani citizenship was indeed introduced to the State Council in February 1998, and was met with fierce opposition from Russian-speaking members of the assembly. See Russian Regional Report, 19 March 1998.
27 `For “Line Five”, for the Cause of Peace-Heads of Republics Protest the New Russian Passports’, Kommersant-Daily, 22 October 1997, quoted in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIX, 42, 1997, p. 7.
28 Itar-Tass, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 November 1997, SU/D30771B. 29 Russia TV channel, 4 November 1997, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 November 1997, SU/D3070/B. 30 Itar-Tass, 29 November 1997. 3 `For “Line Five”, for the Cause of Peace’. 32 Segodnya, 5 November 1997, as quoted by Russia Today, same date. 33 Interfax, 5 November 1997.
34 Gail Lapidus & Renee de Nevers (eds), Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today, (Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1995), p. vii.
35 Leokadiya M. Drobizheva, `Russkie v respublikakh Rossiiskoi Federats’, in Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, Mezhnatsional’nye otnosheniya v Ross i SNG (Moscow, ‘AIRO-XX’, 1995), p. 122. These findings are based on the same project as the book edited by Lapidus & de Nevers. The Russian researchers deal with the findings in more detail in L. M. Drobizheva, A. R. Aklaev, V. V. Koroteeva & G. U. Soldatova, Demokratizatsiya i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90-kh godov (Moscow, Mysl, 1996).
36 Svetlana Ryzhova, `Inter-Group Ethnic Solidarity in Conditions of Constitutional Conflict: Russians in Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, and Tuva’, in Lapidus & de Nevers, p. 68. 37 Drobizheva, `Russkie v respublikakh’, pp. 123-124, 127. 38 Fond Obshchestvennoi Mnenii (FOM), weekly survey no. 374. URL: http:/www.fom.ru/week/ t374_3.htm. Poll conducted in June 1998.
39 FOM weekly survey no. 396. URL:http://www.fom.ru/week/t396_l.htm.Poll conducted in August 1998.
Rossiiskie vesti, 31 December 1997, FBIS-SOV-98-007.
4′ Graham Smith (ed.), The nationalities question in the post-Soviet states (Longman, 1996), p. 505. Readers with knowledge of Scandinavian languages will find a good discussion of this and related issues in Helge Blakkisrud, Den russiskefdderasjon i stopeskjeen. Etniske og territorielle utfordringer (Oslo, Spartacus forlag, 1997).
42 From Solzhenitsyn’s address to the State Duma, October 1994. Reprinted in Grazhdanin Ross, No. 21, 1994.
Interfax, 24 October 1997.
44 See ‘Kontrrevolyutsiya voshla pod maskoi’, Pravda, 4 February 1995; and ‘Rutskoi’, Vechernii Novosibirsk, 21 February 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-040.
as ‘Aleksandr Rutskoi: “Ustayus’s narodom … ‘, Tambovskaya zhizn’, 20 December 1994. 46 For a discussion of different expressions of Russian nationalism, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, `Raising “the Russian Question”. Ethnicity and Statehood-Russkie and Rossiya’, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 2, 1, Spring 1996, pp. 91-110. 47 AFP, 24 October 1997.
48 Interfax, 24 October 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-297.
49 ‘Programma Kommunisticheskoi part Rossiiskoi Federats’, in Informatsionnyibyulleten’, No. 9 (50), 15 may 1997, p. 17.
5o Gennadii Zyuganov, ‘Sovremennaya russkaya ideya-ob”edinyayushchaya ideologiya dlya nashei strany’, Duma, No. 12,1995, reprinted in Gennadii Zyuganov, Veryu vRossiyu (Izdatel’sko-poligraficheskaya firma ‘Voronezh’, 1995), pp. 220-223. 51 ‘K otechestvu’, Pravda, 11 November 1993.
52 `Osnovnye printsipy postroeniya Russkogo gosudarstvo’, Russkii poryadok, 1994, 2-3 (15-16). 53 `Osnovnye polozheniya programmy dvizheniya Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo po postroeniyu natsional’nogo gosudarstva’, Russkii poryadok, No. 9-10, December 1993-January 1994. For a detailed analysis of the ideology of the RNE, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, `Aleksandr Barkashov and the RNE: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation’, Nationalities Papers, 24, 4, 1996.
Sa Aleksandr Sterligov, Nam nuzhno chisto russkoe reshenie, 1993 appeal from the executive committee of the nationalist organisation Russian National Assembly (Russkoe natsional ‘noe sobranie), which he headed.
ss Konstitutsiya rossiiskoi federatsii (Izdatelstvo `OS-89′, 1997). se `Battles over the passport’, Rossiiskie vesti, 1 April 1997, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press XLIX, 13, 1997, p. 21.
57 George Breslauer & Catherine Dale, `Boris Yelt’tsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 13, 4, 1997, p. 329. 58 ITAR-TASS, 2 December 1997.
59 `Statute on the RF Citizen’s Passport’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 July 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-157-S. 6 As a matter of fact, neither the flag, national anthemn or emblem which are in use today are formally acknowledged as Russia’s state symbols. In late January 1998 the Duma refused to approve any of these. Communist, Agrarian and Nationalist deputies favoured a return to the old red flag, without the hammer and sickle. RIA Novosti, 23 January 1998, as quoted by The Jamestown Foundation Monitor, same day.
61 Itar-Tass, 12 July 1996, quoted in Breslauer & Dale; `Boris Yel’tsin and the Invention …’, p. 303.
62 Gruppa konsul’tantov pri Administrats Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Rossiya v poiskakh idei. Analiz pressy, Rabochie materialy, Vypusk 1 (Moscow, 1997).
63 At this point we are talking only about the members of the public belonging to the titular population, and not the ethnic Russians or the non-Russian, non-titular natsmeny residing in a given republic.
64 Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR, p. 32.